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Crime and Punishment:  
An In-Depth Analysis of Security Issues in the European Union 
 
Adam Bisaccia
♦ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The third pillar of the European Union, known as Justice and Home Affairs is paramount to 
European Union security. The pillar consists of a variety of security issues, two of which are 
crime and terrorism. As history has shown, the European Union has continually worked to protect 
the freedoms it has provided its citizens; however, criminals and terrorists have taken advantage, 
and continue to look to take advantage of, these freedoms in order to conduct their activities and 
carry out their operations. Yet, advances in crime-fighting and counter-terrorism have worked to 
thwart  many  of  these  criminal  activities,  thereby  creating  a  safer  and  more  secure  European 
Union.  
An in-depth overview and analysis of the counter-measures and institutions implemented 
by the European Union clearly indicates that the European Union is serious about protecting its 
citizens.  Institutions  such  as  Europol,  Eurojust,  and  FRONTEX  have  helped  to  foster 
communication  and  information-sharing  among  European  Union  member-states.  Yet,  it  is 
important to recognize that despite the European Union’s best efforts, there is still much progress 
to  be  made.  Within  existing  institutions,  there  still  exist  standard  bureaucratic  and  political 
setbacks that accompany a body as large as the European Union.  
A  combination  of  historical  review  and  present-day  analysis  serves  to  provide  an 
overview regarding the topics of organized crime, drugs, terrorism, and the countermeasures to 
these issues. These concepts are explored within in order to provide a complete and thorough 
understanding of the security issues facing the European Union, and its plans to counter these 
threats. 
   
The Development of Preventative Measures 
 
The Trevi Group 
Terrorist attacks throughout the 1960’s and 70’s
1 initiated the call for tighter internal security 
within the European Community. In 1976, the then nine EC members created the Trevi Group, a 
French acronym for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism and International Violence.
2 The Trevi 
Group  consisted  of  ministers  of  justice  and/or  interior,  senior  officials,  and  high-level  police 
chiefs.
3 The Trevi Group sponsored several working groups to respond to the issue of European 
security.
4 Working Group 1 created secure communication links between countries combating 
terrorism. Working Group 2 dealt with exchanging information on police training, forensics, and 
equipment. Several other smaller working groups were additionally created, including a working 
group in 1991 dealing with Europol.
5 
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The Trevi Group did in fact have several successful operations including the dismantling 
of the western European branch of the Islamist group, Hezbollah.
6 However, it was clear that with 
the onset of the planned single market —capital, people, goods, and services—the Trevi Group 
would face serious and pressing security issues. In 1985, the Schengen Agreement was reached, 
calling  for  the  elimination  of  border  checks  between  the  Benelux  countries,  Germany,  and 
France.
7 The reduced border security meant easier access for European citizens; however, illegal 
immigrants, organized crime, and terrorists groups also capitalized on the lack of border security.
8 
In 1991, a Trevi working group established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Europol, and the 
findings of this working group were proposed for the European Council at Maastricht in 1991.
9 
Soon to follow was the Maastricht treaty, which established the three pillars of the European 
Union.  The  third  pillar,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs,  replaced  the  Trevi  Group,  and  served  to 
counter many of the security issues faced by the European Union, especially with its new lax 
border structure. The Maastricht treaty also created the legal framework for Europol.  
 
The Beginnings of Europol 
Though the Trevi Group worked to bring the concept of Europol to reality, the road was not 
always smooth. Many EC countries were weary of a European police force—something strongly 
pushed for by Germany. A steering group for the third pillar, known as the K.4 Committee, 
outlined  the  three  major  proposed  goals  of  Europol.  First,  Europol  was  to  coordinate 
investigations and search operations to assist member-state operations. Second, Europol was to 
create  a  database  to  compile  all  investigative  advancements.  Lastly,  Europol  was  to  create  a 
system to analyze and evaluate the anti-drug efforts of member-states. Because of the amount of 
legislation that it would take to create a fully fledged Europol, a temporary organization was 
established known as Europol Drugs Unit (EDU), while the Europol Convention was still being 
fine-tuned. The Trevi Group ultimately placed EDU in The Hague.  
  A liaison system was set up whereby each member-state sent an official representative to 
the EDU. The EDU was to assist a member-state upon the request of the member-state liaison.
10 
Several restrictions were placed upon the EDU in order to protect the civil liberties of the citizens 
of  the  member-states.  First,  the  EDU  was  prohibited  from  holding  onto  intelligence.  Rather, 
liaison officers would provide the EDU with information to assist in investigative matters, but 
that information was to be returned to the member-state upon conclusion of the investigation. 
Second,  the  EDU  was  not  permitted  to  use  any  executive  police  measures  such  as  arrest, 
undercover work, or surveillance. Third, the EDU was not in charge of liaison officers; rather, the 
member-states controlled EDU liaison officers.
11 
  Nonetheless, the EDU saw tremendous requests for investigative aid from member-states. 
Additionally, these requests grew exponentially year after year. Not only did requests expand, but 
so did the criminal activities that the EDU was working on. Over time, more legislation was 
passed to expand the power of the EDU—however these powers were still rather modest. The 
EDU now saw increased authority to conduct serious joint-investigations with member-states 
upon  their  request.  With  the  progress  that  the  EDU  made,  a  transition  occurred  upon  the 
completion and implementation of the Europol Convention, officially creating Europol; however, 
the true powers of Europol were not implemented until 1999.
12 
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Europol in Modern Day 
Major changes to Europol came when the Treaty of Amsterdam took effect in 1999. The Treaty 
of Amsterdam moved several major areas such as immigration and asylum out of the third pillar 
to  the  Community  pillar.  Therefore,  JHA  was  to  handle  criminal  and  policing  matters.  This 
specifically helped focus the efforts of Europol to criminal matters. The European Union was 
now able to call on a formal, EU-wide police agency. Europol was now able to act independently 
without the need for authorization from the JHA council. However, it is important to note that the 
Treaty of Amsterdam specifically limits policing powers such as uniformed patrolling or arrests 
to member-states.  
Today,  Europol  has  a  staff  of  600.  It  investigates  a  range  of  international  crimes, 
including:  terrorism;  illegal  immigration;  money-laundering;  drug  and  people  trafficking;  and 
pornography.
13 Although Europol lacks any operational powers, it is a focal point for police 
cooperation  within  the  EU  due  to  the  volume  of  information  and  ready  exchange.
14  More 
specifically, Europol is an intelligence gathering organization that works to assist the operations 
of member state law enforcement.
15 
 
CEPOL and PCTF 
Furthermore, in an effort to foster cross-border cooperation, information sharing, and networking, 
2005 saw the creation of the European Police College known as CEPOL.
16 CEPOL’s creation was 
agreed upon at a meeting in Tempere, its purpose—to orchestrate police training in European 
Union member-states.
17 By gathering the combined knowledge and experience of senior level 
police  officers,  these  officers  are  able  to  take  this  training  back  to  their  member-states,  and 
therefore, implement better measures in the fight against crime.  
  Additionally, the European Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF) is another effort on behalf 
of the EU to combat criminal activities. PCTF serves as a forum for high-ranking police chiefs to 
exchange high-level information in an effort to determine the strongest means of thwarting crime 
within their respective member states. It is the hope of the PCTF to build relationships between 
high-ranking  police  officers  so  that  crime-fighting  can  move  beyond  borders  and  become  as 
efficient as possible. 
18 PCTF is another example of the efforts of Justice and Home Affairs to 
foster member-state cooperation.  
 
The European Arrest Warrant 
Perhaps  one  of  the  greatest  movements  in  combating  crime  in  the  European  Union  was  the 
implementation  of  the  European  Arrest  Warrant  (EAW).  On  several  occasions,  the  issue  of 
extradition  arose  among  European  countries.  Several  particular  laws  made  extradition  an 
incredibly long and difficult process. First, states were permitted to deny extradition if the crime 
was of a political nature. Therefore, terrorists often escaped extradition. Second, the concept of 
double-criminality  meant  that  the  crime  had  to  be  recognized  by  both  the  requesting  and 
requested state. Third, states could deny the extradition of their own nationals.
19  
  Following the end of the Cold War, the issue of extradition arose again. Many countries, 
such as Spain, were plagued with terrorist attacks and desperately requested that the requirements 
for extradition be lessened.
20 However, two conventions aimed at fostering an EAW either failed 
or turned stagnant when more pressing issues arose. Frustrated, both Spain and eventually Britain 
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called for the concept of mutual recognition of criminal sentences. The countries argued that 
European Union member-states should have confidence in the judicial systems of the respective 
member-state.  This  idea  soon  gathered  credibility,  and  was  endorsed  by  the  Presidency 
Conclusion to the Tampere European Council in 1999.
21 By 2001, Spain, Germany, Italy, Britain 
and France
22 recognized mutual recognition, ultimately leading to the European Arrest Warrant. 
Due  to  the  September  11,  2001  attacks  on  the  United  States,  the  EAW  was  rushed  through 
European Union legislation, and officially implemented on June 13, 2002. 
  An EAW may be issued by a member-state judge if the individual is accused of a crime 
that carries a punishment of more than a year in prison, or if the individual has been sentenced to 
more than four months in prison.
23 Moreover, the requested country has ninety days to return the 
individual upon request, and ten days if the individual surrenders. The dual criminality principle 
does not apply for thirty-two specific serious crimes that European Union member-states have 
agreed upon such as arms trafficking, human trafficking, child pornography, murder, terrorism, 
etc.  However,  these  crimes  must  be  punishable  by  at  least  three  years  in  prison  under  the 
requesting  member-states  legal  system.  If  this  is  not  shown,  the  concept  of  dual  criminality 
remains in effect.
24 Whether to extradite the individual is no longer a political decision, it is 
mandatory. Moreover, EU member-states cannot refuse to turn over their own nationals. This 
concept stems from the idea that the European Union acts as one body.
25 
  However, there are still several exceptions to the EAW’s applicability. For instance, the 
concept of double jeopardy applies. If the individual has already been tried in the requesting 
country, he may not be sent back. If amnesty covers the individual under the member-states 
national legislation, then that member-state can refuse to turn over the individual. Moreover, if 
the statute of limitations has run in the requesting country, then legally that person may not be 
tried for the crime. Therefore, the requested member-state need not turn over the individual. 
Finally, if the individual has not yet reached the age of majority to be criminally responsible for 
his actions, then the requested member-state need not turn over the individual.
26 
   
EU Crime Issues 
 
Organized Crime 
Perhaps one of the most significant issues that the EU faces is organized crime. With organized 
crime comes an influx of trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans. Violence all too often 
accompanies organized crime. Organized crime effects the very foundations of a society—its 
culture, economy, politics, and safety. Criminal organizations have been able to reach the very 
highest positions in government as well: 
Organized  crime  groups  often  supplant  the  state  in  societies  undergoing  a 
transition  to  democracy,  as  their  representatives  assume  key  positions  in  the 
incipient legislatures, which are responsible for crafting the new legal framework 
for the society. Their presence within the legitimate state institutions undermines 
political  stability  because  their  goals  are  to  further  their  own  criminal 
interests…
27 
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There are several reasons for the increase of organized crime in the European Union. First, with 
the implement of the Single European Act, borders to commerce were dismantled; combine this 
with the use of a single currency—the Euro—and it is easy to see how issues of counterfeiting 
and money laundering can easily increase across EU member-states. Additionally, with the onset 
of the Schengen Agreement, physical borders cease to exist; therefore, organized crime can easily 
spread from one Schengen country to the next. According to the EU Organized Crime Threat 
Assessment (OCTA) 2007, criminal organizations are using legitimate businesses as covers for 
their illegal operations in order to facilitate criminal activities, launder money, and re-invest that 
laundered  money.
28  Moreover,  the  conclusion  OCTA  2006  stated  that  Organized  Crime’s 
targeting of high-level public sector officials for corruption was the biggest threat from criminal 
organizations.
29 Criminal organizations are consistently working to corrupt legitimate businesses 
and individuals to exude their power.  
The EU has worked to combat organized crime through a variety of measures such as the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the Vienna Action Plan on Organized Crime, the European Union Strategy 
for the beginning of the New Millennium, and the Hague Program of 2004.
30  
The Amsterdam Treaty provides in Article 29, that organized crime will be countered 
through closer cooperation between member-state police, customs officials, and other authorities 
by use of Europol, and more effective use of judicial authorities.
31 
The Vienna Action Plan directly acknowledges the problem of organized crime in its 
opening paragraph: 
[O]rganized crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know it and 
want to preserve it [sic]. Criminal behavior no longer is the domain of individuals 
only, but also of organizations that pervade the various structures of civil society, 
and  indeed  society  as  a  whole.  Crime  is  increasingly  organizing  itself  across 
national borders, also taking advantage of the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and persons. Technological innovations such as Internet and electronic 
banking  turn  out  to  be  extremely  convenient  vehicles  either  for  committing 
crimes  or  for  transferring  the  resulting  profits  into  seemingly  licit  activities. 
Fraud and corruption take on massive proportions, defrauding citizens and civic 
institutions alike.
32 
 
The Action plan calls for increased cooperation between police and judicial officials. It calls for a 
legal framework to be implemented to define how Europol and judicial authorities should work 
together on joint investigations.
33  
To continue, the European Union Strategy for the beginning of the New Millennium 
outlines political guidelines and thirty-nine recommendations. The overall call of the Strategy is: 
to  strengthen  collection  of  information  regarding  organized  crime;  prevent  organized  crime 
infiltration  in  the  public  and  private  sector;  strengthen  partnership  between  society  and  the 
criminal justice system; strengthen the investigation of organized crime; strengthen Europol; trace 
and seize the proceeds of organized crime; strengthen cooperation between judicial authorities 
and police; strengthen cooperation of applicant countries;  and, strengthen cooperation with third 
countries and international organizations.
34  
                                                           
    
28 2007 EU ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 12. 
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31 MITSILEGAS, ET AL, at 86-87.  
    
32 MITSILEGAS, ET AL, at 88 
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The Hague Program of 2004 additionally takes a stance against organized crime. The 
Program suggests that European Union member-states implement common methodologies for 
combating  organized  crime,  as  well  as  for  creating  a  crime  statistics  method.  Moreover,  the 
Program calls for greater public-sector transparency through an EU anti-corruption policy. It also 
recommends greater cooperation between state level police and judicial authorities.
35 
 
Narcotics 
Combating drugs has become a major aim of the European Union. This is due to the fact that drug 
use often sparks other crimes—in that drug addicts will commit crimes to earn money to fuel their 
habit.  Moreover,  with  drugs  comes  violence.  The  biggest  problem  that  western  European 
member-states face is heroin.
36 In 1999, nearly half of all UK organized crime operations dealt in 
the trafficking of heroin.
37 Furthermore, synthetic drugs have increased sixteen percent per year 
since the 1970’s. A significant problem is occurring in the central and eastern European Union 
member-states.  These  countries  often  are  used  in  trade  routes  for  drug  trafficking  and  have 
documented significant increases in drug users within their borders.
38 
  In 2004, the Council of the European Union released the EU Drugs Strategy for 2005-
2012. In it, the Council outlines its plans to combat illegal drug use in the European Union. This 
plan implements a regional approach that will target heavily effected European Union member-
states. European Union member-states who are not confronted with similar drug problems are 
able to choose whether or not they participate in such operations.
39 The plan aims at both supply 
and demand reduction. Regarding demand reduction, the European Union plans to accomplish 
this through: preventing people from using drugs; preventing experimental use from becoming a 
habit; early intervention; providing treatment and rehabilitation programs; and, reducing drug-
related health and social damage. In order to reduce the supply, the EU Drugs Strategy calls for: 
increased  police  cooperation;  sharing  of  information  and  knowledge;  and  stronger  ties  with 
Eurojust; better use of Europol, the EAW, the Financial Intelligence Unit, and the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime protocols; consistent prosecutorial measures 
across the board; unification of member-states most heavily affected by drug trade; and tougher 
measures against non-European Union countries that are producing the narcotics.
40 
 
EU Security Issues 
 
Terrorism 
The  member-states  of  the  European  Union  have  independently  battled  terrorism  for  decades. 
Spain has dealt with ETA, Germany with RAF, Italy with the Red Brigade, France with the 
Algerian terrorists and the UK with the IRA. However, with modern day international terrorist 
organization such as al-Qaeda, the threat has become a major issue of the European Union as a 
collective body. The 9/11 attack on the US, 7/7 attack on Britain, and the 3/11 attack on Spain has 
propelled  terrorism  to  the  forefront  of  the  EU  agenda.  Although  the  7/7  and  3/11  attacks  in 
Europe were heavily publicized, that does not mean that those were the only terrorist attacks that 
the European Union faced.  
According to the EU Terrorism and Trend Report 2007, a total of 498 terrorist attacks 
were carried out in the EU in 2006, with 706 individuals suspected of terrorism in fifteen EU 
                                                           
    
35 THE HAGUE PROGRAM. 
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37 MITSILEGAS, ET AL, at 71.  
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40 Id.   
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member-states  arrested  in  that  same  year.
41  More  alarmingly,  despite  all  the  efforts  of  the 
European Union and the member-states, the EU Terrorism and Trend Report 2008, showed an 
increase in terrorist attacks to 583 over the course of 2007.
42 Although the majority of these 
attacks resulted in limited or no material damage, the fact is that the attacks were still carried out, 
with a number of the attacks meant to injure and kill. The European Union does not face simply 
Islamist  terrorism;  it  faces  left-wing  terrorism,  right-wing  terrorism,  eco-terrorism,  and 
ethno/separatist terrorism.  
Ethno/separatist  terrorism  is  carried  out  in  attempt  by  the  organization  to  gain 
independent recognition or sovereignty. It may be motivated by politics, ethnicity, religion, or a 
combination. Ethno/separatist terrorism accounted for 424 attacks in 2006, with France receiving 
sixty percent of the attacks, and Spain receiving nearly all of the rest.
43 Although the majority of 
these attacks are relatively low-level, the ETA attack on Madrid airport did result in deaths and 
significant  injuries,  emphasizing  the  fact  that  these  separatists  are  not  afraid  to  kill  when 
necessary. Left-wing terrorist attacks are carried out in order to shift the political system to the 
extreme left, usually in conformance with Marxist idealism.
44 Greece, Italy, Spain, and Germany 
saw fifty-five left-wing terrorist attacks, and although low-level, several attacks were intended to 
kill. 
It is important to note, that despite these other types of terrorist attacks, Islamist terrorism 
still remains the highest priority of the European Union, and the member-states. Islamist terrorism 
is such a priority due to the extremism involved, and the nature in which the attacks are carried 
out—namely, that they are meant to inflict as many causalities and damage as possible. 2006 saw 
two thwarted Islamist attacks on EU member-states. The first was an attempted bombing of two 
German trains. The second was the attempt to detonate bombs in airplanes traveling from the 
United Kingdom. 2007 saw four thwarted Islamist attacks in the European Union. First was the 
intended detonation of two car bombs outside of a London nightclub. The following day, a car 
was driven into the arrivals terminal of Glasgow Airport; however, the car failed to detonate. In 
Germany, several Islamic radicals were arrested while in the process of making bombs which 
they planned to detonate within Germany. The bombs were said to be more powerful than those 
used in the 3/11 Madrid train bombings. The final thwarted effort was in Denmark, where several 
men were arrested for planning an attack within the borders of Denmark. It was stated one man 
had just returned from terrorist training in Pakistan, and had extensive knowledge and operational 
materials for bomb-making.
45 
 
Counter-Terrorism 
The EU has worked to counter these attacks; however, much like the US, the efforts are mostly 
seen  following  an  attack  or  “near-miss”.  Following  the  September  11
th,  2001  attacks  on  the 
United States, the European Council approved a counter-terrorism plan on September 21, 2001 
that included: enhancement of police and judicial cooperation, a call for member states to better 
identify terrorists within their borders, and an anti-terrorism unit within Europol.
46 Additionally, 
the European Union planned to introduce the European Arrest Warrant, implement all existing 
international  conventions  on  terrorism  as  soon  as  possible,  combat  terrorist  financing,  and 
                                                           
    
41 EU TERRORISM AND TREND REPORT 2007, at 5. 
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strengthen  aviation  security.
47  The  common  definition  of  terrorism  was  reached  for  legal 
purposes, defined as:  
[a]ttacks  upon  a  person’s  life  which  may  cause  death;  2)  attacks  upon  the 
physical  integrity  of  a  person;  3)  kidnapping  or  hostage  taking;  4)  causing 
extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an 
infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located 
on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger 
human life or result in major economic loss; 5) seizure of aircraft, ships or other 
means  of  public  or  goods  transport;  6)  manufacture,  possession,  acquisition, 
transport,  supply  or  use  of  weapons,  explosives  or  of  nuclear,  biological  or 
chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development of, biological and 
chemical weapons; 7) release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or 
explosion the effect of which is to endanger human life; 8) interfering with or 
disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource 
the effect of which is to endanger human life; 8) interfering with or disrupting the 
supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of 
which is to endanger human life; 9) threatening to commit any of the acts listed 
in 1) to 8).
48 
 
This expansive definition of terrorism seeks to avoid any loopholes in the law. Additionally, any 
European Union member-state judge may use this definition in rendering a verdict. Furthermore, 
the European Union agreed to freeze the assets of any person, groups and/or entities involved in 
terrorist activities. The EU also maintains lists regarding those considered terrorist groups, and 
those with terrorist affiliations, which mirrors the United Nations’ list. The EU also maintains a 
separate non-UN list which contains the European terrorist organizations such as the IRA and 
ETA, and the military and political wings of Hamas. Lastly, there is a secret list that contains the 
names of particular terrorists which is used for asset-freezing.
49 
  However, the European Union is still victim to bureaucratic and political setbacks. The 
larger European Union member-states still fail to rely on Europol for the majority of their efforts. 
As  noted  earlier,  Europol  can  request  information,  but  member-states  are  free  to  reject  this 
request if the member state feels that this would pose a risk to the integrity of its investigation. 
Another issue is that Europol cannot initiate investigations; however, as of 2002 it may work 
side-by-side  with  member-state  investigations  as  well  as  request  that  member-state’s  initiate 
investigations. 
Moreover,  2005  saw  the  creation  of  the  European  Counter-Terrorism  Strategy.  This 
strategy, implemented at the national, European, and international level, involves four pillars: 
Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond. Prevention seeks to deter those who would otherwise turn 
to terrorism from doing so by rooting out its causes. The key priorities are to: recognize and stop 
problem behavior, most notably on the internet; introduce criminal offenses for those attempting 
to recruit individuals to extremist causes; educate more of the population on European Union 
policies; create more member-state assistance programs; develop inter-culture dialogue; create a 
forum for discussing issues; and continue research and analysis.
50 Protection is done by reducing 
the vulnerability of European infrastructures to attacks. The European Union’s key priorities in 
this field are: improving EU passports through biometrics; creating a Visa Information System 
and second generation Schengen Information System; developing a risk analysis of the European 
Union’s external borders; developing aviation and maritime security measures; and, developing a 
                                                           
    
47 OCHIPINTI, at 152. 
    
48 EUROPE CONFRONTS TERRORISM, at 174. 
    
49 EUROPE CONFRONTS TERRORISM, at 176. 
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program for critical infrastructure protection.
51 Pursuit is done by impeding terrorist planning, 
travel, and communication both within Europe and abroad. The priorities of the European Union 
in this field are to: strengthen member-state capabilities to combat terrorists; utilize Europol, 
Eurojust  and  the  Joint  Situation  Center  to  the  fullest;  furthering  the  recognition  of  judicial 
decisions; ensuring the full implementation of existing legislation; prevent terrorists from gaining 
possession of a wide variety of weapons; combat terrorist financing; and, providing technical 
assistance  to  third  countries  in  their  efforts  to  combat  terrorism.
52  Response  is  implemented 
incase all other measures fail, in an effort to minimize the damage of an attack.
53 The European 
Union priorities in this field are: to agree to an EU coordination agreement; revise the legislation 
on the Community Mechanism for civil protection; develop risk assessment to respond to an 
attack; improve coordination with international organizations; and, develop approaches to help 
families of victims of terrorism.  
An additional implementation of the European Union is the creation and utilization of 
FRONTEX, the European Union agency tasked with organizing cooperation between member-
states  in  the  issue  of  external  border  security.
54  FRONTEX  has  several  tasks:  coordinating 
operational cooperation between member-states in the field of management of external borders; 
assisting member-states in the training of national border guards, including the establishment of 
common training standards; carrying out risk analyses; following up the development of research 
relevant for the control of persons and surveillance of external borders; assisting member-states in 
circumstances;  requiring  increased  technical  and  operational  assistance  at  external  borders; 
providing member-states with necessary support in organizing joint return operations.
55 Although 
FRONTEX does not have authority within member-states, this agency is crucial in maintaining 
external border security in order to ensure that those who pose a threat the European Union are 
not able to penetrate its borders.  
Moreover, the European Union has signed and committed to furthering the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI). The Initiative allows all signatories to search planes and ships in order to 
seize weapons of mass destruction.
56 Legal, diplomatic, military, and economic measures were 
created and implemented to counter rogue organizations and countries from gaining and using 
WMDs. Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, signatories commit to: undertaking effective 
measures independently or jointly, to locate and seize WMDs in addition to halting and disrupting 
their  transport;  adopting  universal  procedures  for  quick  information  exchange  regarding 
proliferation  activity,  protecting  classified  information,  dedicating  adequate  resources,  and 
maximizing efforts; reviewing and strengthening national legal authorities to better facilitate the 
carrying out of these operations; and, taking specific actions in support of the efforts to thwart the 
transportation of WMDs by not transporting or assisting in the transport of WMDs for or with 
countries  of  proliferation  concern,  boarding  ships  or  planes  to  inspect  for  WMDs  or  similar 
weapons when reasonably suspected, allowing other countries to inspect the signatories ships and 
planes, insisting that vessels leaving or arriving in a signatories country be subject to inspection, 
inspecting in international territory any vessel suspected of transporting WMDs.
57 
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European Union “Homeland Security” 
Thus far, it is obvious to see that the European Union, as a supranational institution, necessarily 
takes a different approach to the concept of homeland security. According to Gustav Lindstrom’s, 
“The EU’s Approach to Homeland Security”, the European Union has several unique approaches. 
First, the European Union works to foster cooperation and communication among member-states, 
rather than acting as a primary responder. The EU, most notably in organizations such as Europol, 
gathers information and compiles databases, but does not initiate investigations on its own, and 
does not respond to threats in an executive power such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Secondly, there are a variety of actors in the European Union that each work towards “homeland 
security”.  These  actors  are  spread  across  the  three  pillars,  and  each  have  a  unique  role—as 
opposed to the unified role of the American Homeland Security. Third, the European Union often 
acts sporadically. It implements new protective measures in a responsive measure, rather than a 
proactive  one.  EU  policies  are  implemented  generally  after  member-state  terrorist  attacks. 
Moreover, member-states tend to have varying levels of protective measures, meaning that there 
is  no  fluidity  in  European  Union  counter-terrorism.  Some  states  maintain  higher  levels  of 
protection than the European Union does as an institution.
58  
A  serious  question  remains  as  to  whether  the  European  Union  can  ever  implement 
something similar to the United States’ Department of Homeland Security. The European Union 
needs to remain in the role of coordinating cooperation between member-states. Additionally, it 
must continue to aid member-states as in intelligence gathering. The European Union must also 
work to protect critical infrastructure, while leaving member-states to look after their national 
infrastructures.
59 The European Union could also create legal regulations for the deployment of 
military  troops  in  response  to  or  prevention  of  terrorist  acts.  Currently,  the  deployment  of 
member-state troops is for humanitarian aid or disaster relief efforts only; however, the EU could 
create legal framework for deploying troops for counter-terrorism.
60  
Moreover, there are other options that can be implemented as well, yet a balance must be 
struck between civil liberties and security. Several proposals have been made to create better 
security,  including:  data  retention  proposals  for  internet  and  phone  records  in  the  European 
Union;  the  use  of  biometric  data  in  European  Union  passports;  the  introduction  of  second 
generation Schengen Information System; transfer of passenger records between the European 
Union and the United States, and initiatives to ban certain individuals from the European Union.
61 
Striking a balance between homeland security and civil liberties is an undoubtedly tough 
task.  At  one  end,  protecting  the  lives  of  European  Union  citizens  is  paramount;  however, 
stripping  away  certain  fundamental  rights  can  be  nearly  as  damaging.  A  cornerstone  of  the 
European  Union  is  the  free  movement  of  goods,  services,  capital,  and  people,  and  with  this 
freedom comes severe challenges. Mr. Lindstrom suggests that the way to implement tougher 
security is for member-states to bind together outside of the European Union. Particular countries 
such as Germany, France, Britain, Spain, and Italy have all considered creating greater security 
measures within their borders. Germany, France, and Spain all have either increased surveillance 
measures, or intend to, in places such as public transportation areas. Britain has proposed tougher 
judicial stances, including the ability to legally hold an individual without charge for up to ninety 
days. These protective measures by the member-states have their own citizens concerned, so it is 
unquestionable that other, less threatened European Union member-states would want nothing to 
do  with  these  measures  on  a  supranational  level.  However,  by  working  bilaterally  or  multi-
laterally,  these  countries  can  work  to  counter  a  common  threat.  If  these  measures  seem 
particularly worthwhile, then they may be adjusted as needed to be adopted on an EU level.
62 
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Such multi-lateral agreements have already been noted. France, Italy, Germany, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom had policy meetings in 2005 in which they agreed to share information 
that would help to thwart organized crime, immigration, and security issues.  Moreover, France, 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Spain, and Austria have all agreed to the 
policies under the Prüm Convention, whereby information sharing is to take place between the 
signatories to combat crime and terrorism.
63 DNA data is to be compiled and placed in a database 
which can be actively searched by signatory countries. However, the DNA is not permitted to 
allow the direct identification of the individual.
64 Moreover, fingerprints are to be stored in a 
similar  database  whereby  signatory  countries  may  search.
65  Furthermore,  signatory  countries 
authorize the use of joint patrols, whereby a particular member-state’s police may patrol jointly 
with  another  member-state’s  police,  on  their  soil.
66  And,  in  the  event  of  an  emergency,  one 
member-state’s police/troops may cross the border of another member-state in order to aid and/or 
combat that threat if deemed necessary by the threatened state.
67  
These  measures  are  undoubtedly  useful  for  combating  crime  and  terrorism  within 
member-states. However, it is understandable that many individuals and even certain member-
states would be weary of allowing such widespread data sharing, and joint patrolling, as would be 
seen if it were held on the EU stage. As for now, multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements seem to 
be serving the purpose of preventing security breaches. Only time will tell if these agreements 
will be seen on an EU level. 
68  
 
Conclusion 
 
In closing, crime and terrorism are significant threats to the European Union and its member-
states. Long before the European Union, member-states have battled crime and terrorism within 
their borders. However, the freedom provided by the European Union—goods, services, capital, 
and persons—has been taken advantage of by criminals and terrorists. These individuals are now 
able to freely move between borders, meaning that their operations can move with them. With 
these  organizations  comes  increased  violence,  drug  use,  and  a  universal  increase  in  criminal 
activity. 
However,  the  European  Union  has  made  significant  efforts  to  combat  crime  and 
terrorism.  The  creation  of  organizations  such  as  Europol,  FRONTEX,  and  Eurojust  (not  to 
mention  the  countless  others)  has  helped  to  coordinate  efforts  so  that  member-states  are  not 
fighting alone. Legislation such as the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Vienna 
Action Plan, and multi-lateral agreements such as the Prüm Convention, have helped make the 
EU a safer place.  
Unfortunately, statistics indicate crime and terrorism are still witnessed all throughout the 
EU. The EU is a symbol of unification and prosperity—a binding of democracies. Member-states, 
specifically the larger ones, need to work more closely with the EU institutions, such as Europol. 
These member-states tend to keep information to themselves, rather than sharing intelligence 
which could be useful to Europol. Moreover, the European Union still remains largely reactive 
when it comes to combating major issues such as terrorism.  
More proactive measures need to be taken, while still working to protect civil liberties as 
much as possible. It is an unfortunate reality that with the freedom that EU citizens enjoy, comes 
an  easier  means  of  conducting  illegal  activities,  and  a  stronger  hatred  among  terrorist 
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organizations. Crime and terrorism are inevitable; however, the European Union is on the right 
path to a safer Europe.  
   
 
 
 
 
 